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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis compares the period of transition to democracy in Portugal and Iran 
after the collapse of the authoritarian regimes through revolutions in 1974 in Portugal and 
1979 in Iran. Despite the similarities the cases share, the outcome of the transition in 
Portugal was a political democracy while Iran faced the rise of authoritarianism. The 
research compares the similar and dissimilar variables between Portugal and Iran such as 
the form of the break with authoritarianism and holding of initial elections, institutional 
design, involvement in wars, and popular mobilization. By keeping respecting factors as 
control variables, the thesis argues for the role of Ayatollah Khomeini, and elite 
decisions, as the most determinative factors influencing the political outcome. In 
Portugal, in the absence of a leader uniting the elite and inability of political factions to 
solely consolidate their power, the Portuguese elite had to compromise. In contrast, in 
Iran, a charismatic leader, who favored the Islamic Republican Party over other factions, 
played the most determinative role in directing Iran toward authoritarianism. 
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Introduction 
Following the third wave of democratization and despite the dominance of the 
discourse of democratization at the international level, the persistence of various forms of 
non-democratic regimes, reveals an interesting paradox for further elaboration of theories 
of political regime change. In this light, this thesis compares the period of transition to 
democracy in Portugal and Iran with the intention to find possible hypothesis explaining 
the differences in the political trajectories of countries. The elaboration on the role of 
Khomeini, the leader of Iranian Revolution, and elite decisions during Iranian transition 
as two major hypotheses forms the central concern and argument of this thesis.  
The transition periods in both countries share similarities that make the 
comparative study of the cases possible. Those similarities are break with authoritarian 
past through a revolution, commitment of elite to hold initial elections, adoption of a 
semi-presidential institutional design, defining a veto-player in constitution, and 
involvement in wars. Along with similarities, there are differences in terms of popular 
mobilization and the amount of institutional power granted to the veto-players in each 
country that can be considered as intervening variables but not necessarily causal ones.  
Therefore, the thesis explains how and why respective intervening variables are 
not causes for different outcomes. Subsequently, it suggests that the most convincing 
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causal explanation relates to the different decisions made by the political elite, and also 
the crucial role of Khomeini as a strong political leader in the case of Iran. The result of 
respective differences was two different outcomes for each country, i.e. democracy in 
Portugal and the rise of authoritarianism in Iran. 
The first section of the thesis is devoted to a brief historical overview of the 
events in both countries. The second section addresses the similarities that cases share 
and argues why the resemblance of cases in various terms had a non-causal quality on 
transition phase. In this section, the first discussed variable is the form of the break with 
authoritarianism, i.e. revolution. In both countries, the authoritarian elite failed to 
peacefully transfer the power and the outcome was a revolution. In the case of break 
through a revolution, the holding of initial elections becomes the important moment 
influencing the future course of the transition. In the both cases, the constituent assembly 
and later presidential elections were held. However both the results of elections and 
outcomes of transitions were different in each country.  
The Institutional engineering has been identified as another similar variable. In 
both countries, following the collapse of the old regime, the semi-presidential system of 
governance was adopted with president holding a considerable amount of power. 
Moreover, in both countries, some factions of elite could guarantee a veto-player role for 
themselves through the institutionalization of a monitoring body over legislature. In the 
case of Portugal this monitoring body was the Council of Revolution consisting the 
communists (Portuguese Communist Party) and leftist military elite involved in initiating 
the coup d’état in 1974. In the case of Iran, clerics and members of the Islamic 
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Republican Party formed the Guardian Council. Although both countries adopted similar 
institutions, by the time that the transitions terminated, the institutions in place in 
Portugal were democratic while the Iranian ones were non-democratic. 
 Ultimately, the third similarity is involvement in wars. Both countries 
experienced war during their transition period, i.e. Iran-Iraq war and continuation of wars 
in the colonies during the interim government of Spinola. The wars were similar in terms 
of being costly and embracing an ideological dimension. Despite similarity in terms of 
involvement in wars, Portugal democratized and Iran didn’t.  
The third section addresses the differences between the cases that are linked to the 
outcomes but do not have an endogenous or causal quality. The popular mobilization and 
the amount of power that was granted to veto-players are two variables that differ 
between cases but are not causal. In terms of the popular mobilization, Iran faced the 
mobilization of the population around Khomeini and the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). 
People started forming revolutionary committees and during elections voted for Islamists. 
In contrast, in Portugal there was a split between the population in the north and the south 
and the population voted in favor of the moderates. Despite the difference, the argument 
can be made that the mobilization of the public in Iran around the Islamists was not the 
reason behind the rise of authoritarianism. The popular mobilization became an asset in 
the hands of the Islamist elite (IRP) to follow their political agenda. Moreover, there have 
been cases when Khomeini as the leader of revolution and member of the IRP claimed 
absolute authority in decision-making process by dismissing other factions and the 
people.   
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Another difference between cases is the amount of power granted to the veto-
players. In Portugal, the Council of Revolution had the power to monitor legislature. In 
Iran, in addition to monitoring the parliament, during the transition period the Guardian 
Council was granted a watchdog role over elections. Thus, it gained the power to limit 
the competition. In this section the argument will be made that despite the difference in 
the amount of power of veto-players, the Guardian Council as an institution did not 
exercise its power autonomously during the transition period and Khomeini as the 
political leader was the most important decision-maker. The argument suggests that 
Guardian Council became important after the termination of the transition. It helped the 
consolidation of power by Islamic Republican Party who could successfully provide the 
party members an office outside of the electoral legitimacy.  
Ultimately, the last section of the thesis is devoted to the arguments regarding the 
most determinative variables, i.e. the role of actors, in directing the phase of transitions in 
each country. The section will discuss how the constitution, and subsequently, the civil-
military relations were reformed in Portugal through the pacts signed between Armed 
Forces Movement (MFA) and civilian parties. Thus, in 1982, by the abolishment of the 
Council of Revolution, the Portuguese democracy was consolidated. In Portugal the 
power division and inability of each elite section to consolidate the power led them 
toward pact-making. In contrast, in Iran, Khomeini could obtain the support of the elite 
and the population and actualize his political ideology. Therefore, in the case of Iran the 
elite disagreements were resolved through Khomeini who held charismatic power. As a 
strong leader, Khomeini was influential in almost every phase of the Iranian transition.  
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In addition to the role of Khomeini, the miscalculation of leftists (Islamist 
Marxists such as Mojahedin-e Khalgh) also will be argued as another crucial factor 
influencing the outcome. The alliance of leftists with Islamists (IRP) for their anti-
western ideological character left the liberal forces (The National Front and the Freedom 
Movement) alone. The outcome was inability of liberals to manage the political chaos 
that ended in their isolation from power. Islamists acquired power with the help of the 
leftists and later betrayed them. Consequently, the persecution of leftists and the isolation 
of liberals left the political scene open for Islamic Republican Party that consolidated its 
power and formed a new authoritarian rule in Iran. 
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Methodology 
This research attempts to test the applicability of different theories of democratic 
transition by comparing the cases of Iran and Portugal.  The research question focuses on 
the reasons behind the failure of democratization in Iran with respect to Portugal’s 
success. The question regarding the conditions that favored Portugal’s democratization 
versus those that constrained Iran’s democratization process is the central concern of this 
paper. Thus, despite the similarities both countries’ share, what different variables in Iran 
had the most determinative impact on Iran’s return to authoritarianism?  
The major hypothesis suggests that while Portugal lacked a strong leader, the 
existence of a charismatic leader in Iran was the most determinative cause influencing the 
transition path. Thus, Khomeini, the leader of revolution in Iran, was the key player 
uniting the elite and mobilizing the public. In contrast, in the absence of a leader in 
Portugal, the elite had to make consensus and cooperate within the democratic rules of 
the game. By the adoption of the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) method, the thesis 
will investigate how and why Khomeini and members of his Islamic Republican Party 
had the determinative impact on the processes of institution crafting, constitution making, 
influencing elite decisions, and mobilizing the public.  
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The MSSD is a method “to compare political systems that share a host of 
common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others” 
(Landman 2003, 29). This method is in search of those variables that cause different 
political outcomes, despite the similarities the cases under study share. The MSSD takes 
the cases that share similar circumstances except one for comparison. Subsequently, if a 
phenomenon occurs in one case and does not occur in the other, that different 
circumstance is either “the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of 
the phenomenon” (Faure 2009, 310). 
 In explaining causation, “the method of concomitant variation” argues that the 
manner that varies differently in two different phenomena is “either the cause or effect of 
that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation” (Faure 2009, 
310). The above explanation means that by taking similarities as control variables, the 
researcher attempts to find those differences that best explain the causal relation. Based 
on this method, this thesis analyses the transition period in Iran and Portugal by 
comparing the following variables: 
 The form of breakdown with authoritarianism (revolution)  
 The elite role during the transition period 
 The involvement in war  
 The institutional engineering and constitution-making processes  
 The popular mobilization 
  
 
  
 
 
8 
 
 
Historical Background 
Modern history of Portugal and Iran over past fifty years has been the stage of 
constant change within domestic politics. Passing through revolutions, Portugal in 1974 
and Iran in 1979, both countries set the start for the formation of a new regime. The 
uncertain period of transitions in both countries was tied to the undemocratic elements in 
constitutional engineering that was jeopardizing the democratic consolidation. Fifteen 
years of struggle by the political elite and the population in Portugal ended in the 
reformation of the constitution and democratization. In contrast, Iran’s political trajectory 
took the path of the return to another non-democratic regime and a constant struggle for 
reform that continues up until today. 
The process of “dissolution of authoritarian regime”, known as transition, occurs 
through the liberalization of the political atmosphere by some actors within the regime. 
The liberalization in forms of granting some socio-political rights to individuals and 
groups has effective consequences on transition phase. The liberalization and transition 
have been identified as a “double stream” process by the liberalization as the 
determinative moment in the commencement of transition. Once the transition is in place 
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the period of uncertainty starts and the future of the regime form is at the stake (Maxwell 
1986, 6-10).  
Adam Przeworski argues that usually the liberalization process starts when there 
is a split among the elite inside the authoritarian regime, or there is some pressure from 
civil society, or both respective factors are present. However, depending on the pace of 
the liberalization, the level of organization of civil society, and the structural and 
institutional capacity of the state to channel the new demands, the political outcomes can 
vary. In this light, in cases where liberalization fails to control the discontent or peaceful 
transfer of power, the society faces the emergence of “mass movements”, “unrest and 
disorder” (1991, 54-58).  
The investigation of the Portuguese and Iranian history confirms the significant role 
of the limited liberalization, the failure of those liberalization policies, and subsequent 
eruption of mass movements. Partial liberalization opened the space for the formation of 
civil society organizations in both countries. However, the states could not tackle the 
social changes. Subsequently, the leaders were caught by revolutions that overthrew the 
decades of authoritarian rule, i.e. the Revolution of Carnations in the aftermath of a 
military coup in Portugal in 1974 and the Iranian Revolution following in 1979. The 
following sections are devoted to a historical overview of the breakdown of the old 
regimes in Portugal and Iran respectively. Thus, the forces involved in both the 
commencement and directing of the transitions, as well as the major decisions and events 
conditioning the political outcomes in each country will be addressed briefly. 
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Portugal 
The comprehension of modern Portugal’s political trajectory is tied to the 
understanding of civil-military relations within the context of wars with the colonies. 
Caetano, the dictator of Portugal before the coup of 1974, was nominated as the new 
leader of Portugal after Antonio Salazar in 1968. Salazar received his power with the help 
of military in aftermath of a coup in 1926 and formed the Second Republic known as 
Estado Novo (New State). Once in power, Salazar drafted a new constitution in 1933 
with “antiparliamentary” and “anticommunist” features. With the economy under the 
control of the state and the police persecuting the communists, Portugal under Salazar, 
turned to a corporatist state without tolerance for opposition forces. In the case of the 
Salazar the economic modernization to fund the wars benefited the state and a few 
families on the top leaving the majority of the population poor (Anderson 2000, 144-
146).   
The transfer of power to Caetano in 1968 opened a new phase in the Portuguese 
history since Caetano liberalized both economic and political spheres. In a relatively open 
political environment and within the context of wars with the colonies, opposition anti-
regime activities and especially labor strikes were organized (Anderson 2000, 156). 
Caetano allowed the return of the previously exiled opposition elite like Mario Soares. 
The regime also allowed the entrance of liberals into the National Assembly’s elections. 
However, despite the willingness of liberals to cooperate with Caetano to gradually 
democratize Portugal, Caetano swung to the right of the political spectrum discontinuing 
the liberalization (Maxwell 1986, 113). Another mistake made by Caetano was the 
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rejection of General de Spinola’s plan to end the war in Guinea through negotiated 
settlement with Guinea’s liberation movement1 (Maxwell 1986, 112).  
Caetano, who in early 1960s was supportive of the federative system of 
governance for Portugal and its colonies, gained his power with the support of right-wing 
military officers with the condition of continuing wars in the colonies. The fear of being 
overthrown by the right-wing military officers who were aware of Caetano’s early 
theories of creating a confederative state with the colonies pushed him toward 
cooperation with the right-wings. Thus, he continued the war, as well as terminated his 
own liberalization polices. Caetano fearful of the right-wing elite miscalculated the threat 
of the leftists in military. These leftist senior officers formed the Armed Forces 
Movement and terminated Caetano’s rule through a military coup in 1974. The coup was 
followed by a revolution that ultimately overthrew the old regime (Maxwell 1986, 112). 
The Armed Forces Movement (MFA) in Portugal was originated in the context of 
losing the wars and shifting policies of government in expanding the armed forces. The 
lack of forces and the need for recruitment led to the adoption of poorer standards for 
admission. Middle ranks were unsatisfied with the exclusionary system of promotion 
benefiting mainly seniors. Moreover, the new policies in favor of new combaters who 
were not reliable but were necessary to continue the wars antagonized the middle-ranked 
officers. The middle-rank military officers formed the MFA; senior officers also 
supported them. General de Costa Gomes, the chief of the general staff, and General 
                                                       
1 PAIBC: Partido Africano de Independencia para Guine e Cabo Verde 
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Antonio de Spinola, the deputy chief also joined the movement. The result was the 
military coup in 1974 (Maxwell 1997, 110-111).  
 Ideological leanings of parties formed in Portugal ranged between right, center, 
left-leaning and liberal parties. During Salazar’s regime in 1960s and 1970s, there was 
limited tolerance for some right and center leaning opposition groups. However, given 
the anti-communist nature of Salazar’s regime, the leftists (socialists and communists) 
were persecuted and went underground. Besides underground organizations, there were 
some exiled opposition leaders who returned to Portugal in aftermath of revolution and 
formed their own parties (Wiarda & Mott 2001, 130-131).  
 The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was at the very end of the left spectrum 
with Alvaro Cunhal, a Leninist communist, as the leader. The Socialist Party (PS) was 
more moderate and less radical than the PCP and had Mario Soares as its leader. The 
moderate Social Democratic Party (PSD2) was in the center of the political spectrum. 
There were also right-wing parties such as Social Democratic Center (CDS) of Amaral 
that turned into Popular Party (PP). The right parties were affiliated with the authoritarian 
regime, and thus, were marginalized in the political game (Wiarda & Mott 2001, 132-
138).  
 Following the collapse of the Caetano’s regime, the Junta of National Salvation 
(JSN) with the leadership of conservative General de Spinola was formed. While there 
was an interim government (JSN) in charge of the country, the MFA that had carried out 
                                                       
2 The liberals of the National Assembly who had resigned in 1972 had formed the People’s Democratic 
Party (PPD). This party adopted social democratic ideology and changed its name to Social Democratic 
Party (PSD). It defined itself as a non-Marxists leftist party (Opello 1991, 89).  
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the coup adopted the watchdog role over political decisions. The high-ranking 
conservative officers formed the JSN, while the MFA’s elite were low-ranking officers 
with leftist tendencies. In the environment of ideological disagreements between JSN and 
MFA regarding the continuation of wars, the PCP with the leadership of Cunhal sided 
with leftist MFA. The confrontation of conservatives and leftists ended in the failure of 
Spinola’s government, and subsequent power take-over by the MFA and its communist 
allies (Opello 1991, 87-90). 
 Following the dominance of radical leftists, the Council of Revolution consisting 
of the chiefs of three branches of the armed forces, the president and prime minister, and 
officers assigned by MFA gained the control. They started the process of the 
militarization of the governing. These radical leftist policies antagonized moderate 
civilian leaders such as Soares. In the context of disagreements regarding the future of the 
regime, the elections of Constituent Assembly was held. The Result illustrated the 
divided nature of the Portuguese society with industrial Lisbon in favor of PCP3, and 
conservative north in favor of PSD4 and CDS5, and PS6 with a national support (Opello 
1991, 93-94)  
The persistence of the PCP and the MFA to exercise veto power and implement 
nationalization policies alienated both the winning parties and the population of mainly 
                                                       
3 PCP collected 12.5 percent of the votes (Opello 1991, 94) 
4 PSD collected 26.4 percent of the votes (Opello 1991, 94) 
5 CDS collected 7.7 percent of the votes (Opello 1991, 94) 
6 PS collected 37.9 percent of the votes (Opello 1991, 94) 
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northern regions. The outcome was the withdrawal of the PS and the CDS from the 
provisional government, the mobilization of the peasant scared of the nationalization 
policies in northern regions, and the commencement of a guerrilla warfare by 
underground right-wing organizations7 (Opello 1991, 95). 
At the verge of a possible civil war by mobilized publics, General Eaens, the 
representative of the moderate faction of MFA took over the power through a 
countercoup (Graham 1992, 284-287). Eanes played important role in future political 
developments that resulted in the reformation of the constitution. In Portugal, the 
uncertain situation and constant power take-over by various factions and leaders forced 
them to compromise and redefine the civil-military relations. A compromise among elite 
occurred due to the inability of the leaders of each section to exclusively consolidate the 
power and also the likelihood for a civil war. In the absence of a single strong governing 
power, the MFA and civilian elite signed pact agreements to normalize the relations 
between MFA and civilian parties. The pacts redefined and relatively limited the 
responsibilities of the Council of Revolution and also the role of MFA. The democracy in 
Portugal did not consolidate until the revision of the constitution in 1982 that abolished 
the Council of Revolution (Graham 1992, 286-290). 
 
 
 
                                                       
7 Democratic Liberation Movement of Portugal (MDLP) and Portuguese Liberation Army ( EPL) 
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Iran 
 Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the last successor of Pahlavi dynasty, faced the 
emergence of the oil nationalization movement with the leadership of Mohammad 
Mussadegh in early 1950s. The attempts of a democratically elected Prime Minister who 
to nationalize the Oil industry were prevented through a coup backed by the US in 1953. 
Mussadegh’s government was overthrown and the Shah returned to power. The Shah 
consolidated his power and created a monarchical authoritarian regime. The state that the 
Shah established was centralized with technocratic apparatus and had a powerful military 
(Momayesi 2000, 45-47). Shah was obsessed with the construction of a strong state both 
internally and externally. Thus, he expanded the military and centralized the 
administrative hierarchy. The memory of his father’s acquisition of power through a 
military coup, and the history of Mussadegh’s election, made the Shah fearful from 
losing his power. The strategy he chose was the creation of a strong state to protect his 
dynasty from all sorts of threats (Motalle 1995, 8-9). 
 The rule of the Shah coincided with the oil boom in 1970s. The Shah’s economic 
policies from 1960s to late 1970s were influenced by growth in oil income and were 
geared toward rapid modernization of the country. However, the economic policies 
implemented by Shah favored few rich at the top leaving those at the bottom poor. 
Special support of foreign investors and reducing the foreign competition, tax cuts and 
low rate loans to few big industries, credit policies favoring large industries and 
agricultural business, were some of the reforms favoring few in the top (Keddie 1980, 
221-224). Despite Shah’s reforms known as White Revolution, the literacy rate was still 
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low and major development plans were centralized in major cities like Tehran while the 
countryside was left poor and underdeveloped (Abrahamian 2008, 142).  
 The creation of a strong autocratic state and the adoption of US-sponsored 
economic policies benefiting the rich antagonized the people and the elite. In addition to 
the discontent caused by the economic policies, the reformation of family laws also was 
perceived as anti-religious and mobilized the clergy and religious sectors of the society. 
The left and intellectuals also supported the clerics against the Shah (Mottale 1995, 5-6). 
People saw the Shah as a dictator acting against Iranian people’s interests autocratically 
and irresponsibly. 
The discontented opposition forces in Iran were divided along the ethnic and class 
lines. Among these opposition movements were the nationalist movement of Kurds in 
northwest, Beluchis in southeast, and Arabs in oil-rich province of Khuzestan. These 
independence movements were involved in armed struggle and were tied to the ethnic 
groups in neighbor countries.  However, the regime could suppress them. Besides the 
ethnic unrest, there were strikes organized by factory workers, especially in oil industry. 
Student strikes and bazaries’ semi-religious gatherings were among other opposition 
forces (Keddie1980, 231-233). Within the context of strikes and civil discontent, as well 
as following the criticism of Iranian regime by the international society and Carter’s 
policy of perusing human rights, the Shah allowed partial liberalization. However, the 
Shah miscalculated his level of popularity in the public, and thus, his hope for mitigating 
the discontent did not work in his favor. In contrast, it opened the space for the 
organization of the opposition (Abrahamian 2008, 157).  
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 The Shah forced the establishment of a single-party system in Iran with his Hezb-e 
Rastakhiz as the sole legitimate party in Iran. However, throughout several decades Iran 
had faced the establishment of various parties with leftist, Islamist, and secular 
ideological inclination that later played major role in the revolution. There were overlaps 
along the lines of ethnic identity, leftist ideology, secular/liberal, and Islamist tendencies.
 The communist Tudeh Party was persecuted harshly by the regime after the coup of 
1953. Hence, the party went underground and later was split into three different factions8 
(Abrahamian 1982, 451-454). Among leftist groups there were also militant 
Marxist/Islamist organizations like Cherikha-yi Feda’I Khalq-I Iran (Fedayeen Khalgh) 
and Islamist Marxists like Mujahedin-I Khalq-I Iran (Mojahedin-e Khalgh) that were 
involved in military opposition (Abrahamian 1982, 481).  
 Among the liberal-leaning parties, the National Front consisting Mussadegh’s 
supporters like Iran Party’s Karim Sanjabi, Darioush Foruhar of Mussadegh’s National 
Party, Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Talieghani as members of the Freedom Movement. 
In 1960s the regime started to persecute the party members and party split due to some 
disagreements. The outcome was the formation of the Second National Front with mainly 
Iran Party’s members. The rival block included the Liberation Movement, the National 
Party, and the Socialist Society and named itself Third National Front and established 
good relations with religious leaders in exile, specifically with Khomeini. The National 
                                                       
8 The ethnic Kurdish circle of the party formed the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran with the political 
project of establishing an autonomous Kurdistan. The senior members of Tudeh formed the Marxist-
Leninist Tofan organization. The third faction was the student organization abroad that established 
Revolutionary Organization of Tudeh Party Abroad (Abrahamian 1982, 451-454). 
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Front leaders had the goal of bridging the old gap between secular-religious and 
modernist-traditional elite forces (Abrahamian 1982, 457-459).  
 The Liberation Movement was another significant party operating both 
underground and abroad that reorganized itself during the revolution. With leaders like 
Bazargan and Taleghani, and exiled elite like Ibrahim Yazdi and Mustafa Chamran, as 
well as Sadeq Qotbzadeh and Abdul Hassan Bani Sadr. The Liberation Movement could 
maintain close links with Khomeini and after the revolution gained the control of the 
provisional government (Abrahamian 1982, 462-464).  
 The clerical opposition had three major factions. The first faction consisted of 
apolitical clerics but they essentially sympathized with the rest and joined the revolution. 
The second faction included ulamas like Ayatollah Shariatmadari, Golpaygani, and 
ethnically Azeri cleric, the supporter of Mussadegh and National Resistance Movement, 
Zanjani. This faction was moderate and used its links to Shah’s government to lobby for 
change but Shah antagonized them by insulting the bazaries and seminaries. And finally 
the third faction involved cleric like Ayatollah Khomeini, Montazeri, Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, and Ali Khamenei with militant tendencies. The last faction was the most 
radical of the religious clergy since Khomeini was in exile and had no reason for 
compromise (Abrahamian 1982, 473-475). The last faction that formed the Islamic 
Republican Party was the most Islamic fundamentalist party was made up of lower clergy 
with the support of the bazaar. Most of its members were in favor of Khomeini’s theory 
of incorporation of Islam into the political system. Islamic Republican Party (IRP) later 
succeeded to consolidate its power over other factions (Bashiriyeh 1984, 128-129). 
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  As explained before, Shah adopted some liberalization policies. However, similar 
to Caetano in the case of Portugal, Shah also failed to cooperate with the weak and 
mainly liberal-dominated opposition forces during the 1977 liberalized atmosphere. 
Therefore, Shah lost the chance to democratize the regime and persisted on his one-party 
system of governance. Subsequently, the opposition mobilized in support of Khomeini, 
the cleric in exile, as the major opponent of the regime. At this stage the liberals who 
were aware of their lack of popularity allied with Khomeini. The clashes occurred 
between the public and the regime’s forces and in 1978 the opposition was radicalized. 
The regime was under pressure, and thus, allowed the legal participation of parties in 
parliamentary elections. Following this new decision, Bazargan of the Liberation 
Movement and Sanjabi of the National Front attempted to participate in elections but 
Khomeini refused and called the regime illegitimate. Khomeini did not compromise, and 
thus, no peaceful form of power transfer occurred. The outcome was a revolution in 1979 
(Chehabi 1995, 128-130). The role of the Guerilla organizations like Mojahedin and 
Fadayeen who supported the pro-revolutionary air-force cadres’ rebellion in February 9th, 
1979 has also been influential.  Through the support of respective leftists groups, the 
Imperial Guards were defeated and in two days the power was transferred to 
revolutionaries (Keddie 2006, 238).  
 After the collapse of the old regime in 1979, two competing bodies were formed. 
One body was the provisional government with the leadership of Bazargan and the other 
one was the Guardian Council with majority clerics. This body had been formed before 
the entrance of Khomeini to Iran (Chehabi 1995, 132). The two institutions consisted of 
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two ideologically different groups with Khomeini being the supporter of Islamists (IRP) 
in the Guardian Council. The radicalization of the society and the chaos due to the 
unstable revolutionary circumstances hindered the task of the controlling the country for 
the provisional government. Following the US embassy take over by the radical Islamist 
students known as “Followers of Khomeini’s Line” in November 1979, Bazargan’s 
provisional government resigned. The following president, Bani Sadr also was forced to 
leave the office in 1981 due to his rivalry with Islamic Republican Party. Once the liberal 
forces were defeated, the Islamic Republican Party of Khomeini took over the power and 
consolidated its base in government since 1983 (Keddie 2004, 625).  
 The consolidation of power was tied to the institutionalization of the Guardian 
Council as the body consisting of clerics who had the veto power over the constitution. 
Khomeini was given the Supreme Leadership position for life. The Assembly of Experts 
was formed with the charge of replacing Khomeini with a new leader after his death. 
Despite the existence of elections for parliament and presidency, the religious authority 
was granted some power outside of the electoral legitimacy (Abrahamian 2008, 164-165). 
The new political system, i.e. the form of the Islamic Republic, was consolidated and Iran 
up until today operates within the same undemocratic framework.
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What do Portugal and Iran Have in Common? 
 
Commencement of Transition 
In comparing the point of departure in both cases, the form of the breakdown of 
authoritarianism through revolution is a major similarity both cases share. Transition in 
Portugal occurred in April of 1974 through a military coup d’état carried out by the 
middle-rank military officers known as Armed Forced Movement (MFA). The coup was 
followed by a revolution known as the Revolution of Carnation. The mobilized public 
marched in streets putting flowers on the barrels of rifles and put an end to the 
dictatorship of Caetano. In the case of Iran, the Shah’s regime faced the emergence of 
public demonstrations and the criticism of the various factions of civilian elite. The 
Shah’s regime became illegitimate, and following the departure of the Shah in the winter 
of 1979 and the return of exiled cleric, Khomeini, people toppled the old regime through 
a revolution. 
The breakdown of authoritarianism occurs through various causes. Pacts, 
imposition, reform, and revolution have been identified as the possible procedures 
causing the collapse of the old regime (Karl & Schmitter 1991). In pacts there is a 
“multilateral compromise” among elite demanding a regime change. The imposition 
refers to the collapse of the old regime through the unilateral usage of the force by elite. 
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The reform occurs when elite compromise in response to a mass mobilization and there is 
no usage of violence. In contrast to reform, revolution is an armed upsurge of the masses 
that ends in the victory of people over authoritarian leaders (Karl & Schmitter 1991, 275).  
As discussed before, the failure of Caetano and the Shah to cooperate with the 
forces of opposition hindered any prospect for regime led transition. In Portugal, Caetano 
lost the political momentum when he refused the demand of the liberal elite to 
democratize the regime (Maxwell 1986, 113). In Iran, similarly, Shah lost the moment to 
transfer the power and initiate a transition. If Shah had made a coalition government with 
the National Front during the first half of 1978, a transition would have been possible. 
However, Shah continued the persecution of the opposition. Later, the Shah offered some 
of his opponents like Sanjabi a premiership but they refused. Hence, there was no chance 
for a regime led transition (Chehabi 1995, 128). 
The form of the break with authoritarian regime suggests specific socio-political 
features tied to the character of the authoritarian regime. The arrangement of social and 
political forces differs in various authoritarian regimes, and subsequently, influences the 
form of the break, as well as the path of the transition. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan 
(1996) propose a typology that draws a relation between the prior nondemocratic 
regime’s form and the form of the break with authoritarianism. The typology identifies 
authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic regimes with their distinct civil 
and political features.  
In the case of authoritarian regimes, if the regime is in its late stages there is a 
chance for the existence of a civil society and a culture supportive of the 
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constitutionalism and the rule of law, as well as a stable bureaucracy and institutionalized 
economic society. In such regimes, there will be a chance for the formation of an 
autonomous political society in favor of democracy. In contrast, in sultanistic regimes, 
the sultan holds and exercises power. Hence, there is not enough room for the formation 
of an autonomous civil and political society in the form of a democratic opposition. Thus, 
following the collapse of the regime, the democracy-crafting will be tied to the 
reconstruction of all social, political and economic institutions (Linz and Stepan 19 96, 
55-65).  
The above-explained characteristics of civil and political society condition both 
the possible forms of the break and the future political trajectory during the transition. In 
the light of their typology, Linz and Stepan explain that in those cases where the 
breakdown of the old regime has occurred either through a non-hierarchic military or 
popular upsurge, the holding of initial elections is a crucial decision for democratization. 
In comparing the sultanistic and authoritarian regimes, the authors argue for the 
possibility of the existence of an organized democratic opposition pushing for elections in 
authoritarian regimes. Otherwise, in the absence of an organized society, the interim 
government can exercise a revolutionary power and delay the transition. In the case of 
sultanistic regimes, there is a high chance that the interim government acts on behalf of 
people and defers the elections, unless the democratic elite succeeds to hold elections 
(1996, 59).  
In the both cases of Portugal and Iran, despite the dissimilar regime types, i.e. 
Portugal an authoritarian regime and Iran a sultanistic one, elite could succeed to hold 
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elections. In the case of Portugal, the written commitment of the Armed Forces 
Movement made them to hold elections. In the case of Iran, the secular elite who had 
connections with Khomeini succeeded to convince him and get the permission for the 
holding of elections. Thus, In Portugal, the first election was held a year after revolution, 
in April of 1975, to elect the constituent assembly. There was also a date for the election 
of the Parliament and President one year after the Constitution Assembly finished its duty 
(Linz and Stepan 1996, 120-121). In Iran also liberal elite pressured for the holding of 
constituent assembly’s elections in the summer of 1979. Following that the presidential 
and parliamentary elections were held and the government was formed.  
Linz and Stepan argue for the essential role of initial elections in Portugal’s case. 
The holding of elections brought new democratically oriented forces into power. In 
contrast, in Iran the holding of elections brought those Islamists into power that weren’t 
supportive of democracy. The difference in outcome despite the similar procedure 
suggests the assumption that the holding of initial elections during the transition period 
per se cannot be an explanatory variable for the cases under study. Therefore, despite the 
fact that elections in Portugal brought democratic forces into power and Portugal 
democratized, in Iran elections brought Islamists into power.  
Therefore, based on the typology one can conclude: the previous regime types 
were different; Portugal was autocracy whereas Iran had a sultanistic regime. The form of 
the break with authoritarianism was similar. In both cases elite committed to hold initial 
elections. However, the political outcomes were entirely different. The resemblance of 
the mode of break and the expected procedure leading to democracy, i.e. holding of 
  
 
25
elections suggest that the prior regime type and the subsequent level of civil and political 
organization cannot be considered an explanatory variable. The similarity in the form of 
the break and also holding of elections allow for the exclusion of regime type as a 
determinative variable. Subsequently, the level of the organization of civil and political 
societies in each country can also be considered a control variable and excluded from 
causes influencing the transition phase.  
 
Institutional Engineering  
Despite the holding of the constituent assembly’s election explained in the 
previous section, another interesting point of correspondence was the lack of sovereignty 
of assemblies in crafting the constitution. The institutional engineering in both Portugal 
and Iran took place within a framework that was proposed by forces involved in the 
revolutions prior to the crafting of constitutions. In Portugal, the MFA revolutionary 
forces prior to the elections of the constituent assembly, could guarantee themselves 
supremacy in hierarchy of power. This meant that through a pact signed between MFA 
and political parties, MFA had superior position in respect to the national assembly. The 
MFA also guaranteed itself an equal voice with national assembly to elect the president 
(Maxwell 1885, 112).  
In Iran, a referendum was held prior to the election of the constituent assembly 
that defined the form of the state as an Islamic Republic. The referendum that was pushed 
by Khomeini and his Islamist followers gave the public the chance for a yes-no vote for 
the single option of Islamic Republic as a state form.  Various elite factions opposed this 
  
 
26
decision and suggested the addition of more options, like democratic republic, or only 
democratic. Despite the disagreements, the referendum with a single choice of Islamic 
Republic was held. The yes vote by the public mobilized around Khomeini and his IRP 
defined the form of the state as Islamic Republic and the constitution was crafted within 
the framework of the Islamic Republic (Bakhash 1984, 72-73). Determining the form of 
the state logically expected some form of institutional arrangement assuring that the state 
reflects its expected Islamic character.  
In both cases, one faction of elite (Islamists in Iran and radical leftists in Portugal) 
set the conditions for the formation of a veto-player to exercise power outside of the 
electoral legitimacy. The literature of comparative politics has devoted a vast attention to 
the institutional engineering, i.e. presidentialism, parliamentarian, or semi-presidentialism 
and the influence of these institutional forms on democratic sustainability. The literature, 
specifically in the field of rational-institutionalism, stems from Madison’s argument in 
federalist 10 where he discusses the selfish motivations of actors, and subsequent 
necessity to install institutions to control those motivations (Shugart 2005, 328). In this 
regard, Matthew Shugart discuses that for Madison the method for monitoring the 
objectives of various agents involved in political game were through an institutional 
model based on hierarchy. In adding to Madison’s discussion, Shugart argues for the 
necessity of both “hierarchical and transactional authority patterns between institutions” 
(2005, 328). In this light, the arguments regarding the benefits and shortcomings of 
various institutional forms in terms of guaranteeing vertical and horizontal accountability, 
as well as reducing the space for manipulation becomes relevant.  
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Hence, when there is any form of institutional engineering through which specific 
factions of elite can exercise power outside of the electoral accountability, the regime is 
not democratic. The existence of what Pzerworski calls a “second tier” can grant some 
elite more power outside of the electoral legitimacy (1991,9). If these elite could 
institutionalize and consolidate the mechanism of exercising power outside of the 
electoral legitimacy, the result of the transition will be either some form of new 
authoritarianism or a façade democracy. George Tsebelis, similarly, talks about the 
institutional and partisan veto-players. The author explains that “[i]n order to change 
policies-or, as we will say henceforth, to change the (legislative) status quo—a certain 
number of individual or collective actors have to agree to the proposed change. I call such 
actors veto players” (2002, 2). 
From Tsebelis’s point of view, the good way of understanding the nature of both 
non-democratic and democratic (presidential and parliamentary) systems is 
comprehension of the law-making process. He asks for four major questions that have 
definitive consequences on the regime’s form. The questions are as follows: 
            “How are veto players selected? 
Who are the veto players? (Who needs to agree for a change of the status quo?) 
Who controls the legislative agenda? (Who makes proposals to whom and under 
what rules?) 
If these players are collective, under what rules does each of them decide (simple 
majority, qualified majority, or unanimity)? ” (2002, 76)  
 
The aforementioned explanation is relevant for the cases under study both in 
terms of their institutional design and previously discussed veto-players. In Portugal, a 
semi-presidential system was adopted and both the parliament and president were 
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popularly elected. Despite the division of power between the president and the 
parliament, in Portugal the president could exercise an extensive power. S/he could form 
or dismiss governments, specifically during the times when no party could win the 
majority of parliament seats (Bruneau 1997, 9-10).  In Iran also a semi-presidential 
system was implemented by having both popularly elected parliament and a president. 
The prime minister would lead the cabinet. However, the president had the duty of 
assigning the prime minister and the cabinet and the parliament had the duty of 
confirming the prime minister (Bakhash 1984, 83). Thus, similar to Portugal, in Iran also 
the president held a considerable amount of power.  
The implications of semi-presidential systems on democratization have been 
discussed in the literature. However, the argument regarding the role of the institutional 
engineering determining the governing system, and subsequent behavior of political 
actors is irrelevant to the cases under study. The semi-presidential institutional design in 
both countries suggests that the institutional design during the transition phase per se 
cannot be considered the determinative cause explaining the different outcomes.  
While both cases had similar institutional engineering, they resembled also in 
terms of defining veto-players. Hence, the power of Islamists in Iran and the leftist 
military elite in Portugal were institutionalized through a veto-player institution known as 
the Guardian Council in the former and the Council of Revolution in the latter one. As 
already has been explained, in both cases the councils had the role of monitoring the 
legislature outside of the electoral accountability. The resemblance in the existence of a 
veto-player in both cases is another control variable justifying the comparability of the 
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cases. The institutional similarities discussed so far suggest that the consolidation of 
democracy in Portugal or the rise of authoritarianism in Iran is not endogenous to semi-
presidential systems and veto-players. The fact that both adopted similar institutions but 
the outcomes were different shows that the form of the institution during the transition is 
not the most determinative variable. Therefore, the institutional design can be considered 
a control variable since during the transition phase, not the institutions but the actors who 
craft the institutions are the important players directing the process of transition. This 
logic applies to both cases of Portugal and Iran since the crafting of institutions during 
the transition period is uncertain and depended upon the elite decisions.  
 
Involvement in War 
The similarities between cases in terms of the form of broke with 
authoritarianism, elite decisions, and institutional engineering has been argued so far. The 
last subject to address is the involvement in wars. The uncertain period of the transition 
coincided with the involvement in wars that intensified the political instability. The broke 
with authoritarianism in Portugal occurred during Portugal’s war with colonies. Iran’s 
war started one year after the revolution in September of 1980 and continued for eight 
years. However, the wars with the colonies in Portugal continued during the transition 
period when General de Spinola was in charge of the interim government. Thus, both 
countries experienced wars during their transition period.  
There is a consensus among scholars regarding the positive relation of war with 
transition toward democracy (Bermeo 2003, 159). The increase in the possibility of elite 
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settlement in the cases of “costly and inconclusive” wars has been recognized in the 
discipline. Thus, if the wars are costly and the outcome is not certain, there is a high 
chance for elite settlement to manage the chaotic situation of the country. The 
investigation of Portuguese colonial wars and Iran-Iraq war demonstrates similarities in 
terms of the nature of wars.  However, despite the similarity in involvement in wars, the 
cases did not share similar political trajectories.  
Both countries suffered due to the costly wars in terms of both human casualties 
and economic damage. Portugal’s wars in colonies of Mozambique, Guinea, and Angola 
were extremely costly. High percentage of Portuguese population participated in wars 
due to the pressure of the government. At the time of the termination of wars, Portugal 
had around 28,000 wounded and 7,700 only-combat related deaths (Bermeo 2009, 
391,392). Similarly, Iran-Iraq war that began in September of 1980 by Iraqi invasion of 
Iran left around one million human casualties during eight years (Ansari 2003, 238). 
 In the case of Portugal, in four years 6.8 percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was devoted to defense expenditure. There was an increase in military labor 
service from 6.5 per cent to 8.0 per cent during the years of 1970-1973 (Bermeo 2009, 
391-392). Similarly, Iran’s economic infrastructure embraced massive damage. The war 
coincided with the economic embargo subjected by the US and Western countries, and 
caused great deficits to Iranian economy. For instance, there was $10.6 billion budget 
deficit and the government’s spending on war consisted of 16 per cent of annual budget 
of $44 billion (Moghaddam 2008, 32). 
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In addition to being costly, both wars also embraced an ideological expansionist 
dimension. General de Spinola as the president of the interim government was in favor of 
the continuation of wars in the colonies. He and his conservative camp had the belief that 
Portugal will be able to keep its control over the colonies in Africa. Spinola had the goal 
of resolving Portugal’s economic crisis through adoption of a political democracy and 
integration into European Community. Besides this, Spinola had also the belief that the 
adoption of respective policies will help to unite Portugal with its colonies. This 
conservative approach toward the colonies became a point of dispute between him and 
MFA’s members involved in the coup who later forced him to leave the office (Graham 
1992, 284-287). In the Iranian case, despite the fact that Iraq started the war, there was an 
ideological dimension put forward by Khomeini. The underlying idea was that the values 
of revolution belonged not only to Iran but human kind and Muslims. Subsequently, the 
revolution was perceived as an ideology not limited to Iran but as a political project that 
could be pursed universally (Moghaddam 2008, 32).  
The similarity in wars and difference in outcomes of transitions suggests that the 
political outcome is not linked to the nature of wars for the cases under study. The nature 
of wars in Portugal and Iran resembled. Thus, nature of wars in both cases is not causal to 
the political outcomes and can be considered as a control variable. It will be explained in 
third section that how the Iran-Iraq war was used as an excuse by the Islamist elite to 
build a state with Islamic identity and the war continued for eight years.
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What Don’t Iran and Portugal Have in Common? 
The dissimilarities between cases can be considered possible causal variables 
determining the outcomes. However, not every difference is endogenous or causal in 
explaining the results. Regarding the transitions in Portugal and Iran, there are differences 
in the institutional design, the form of the popular mobilization, as well as elite decisions. 
However, the argument can be made that among respective variables, the difference in 
the popular mobilization and the institutional design are not causal variables in explaining 
the failure of democratization in Iran. 
The mobilization was around Khomeini, and his Islamic Republican party, and 
thus, was linked to Khomeini’s speeches and decisions. In other words, the popular 
mobilization in Iran did not necessarily follow the lines of policies and political projects 
proposed by the factions and parties, and thus, did not provide a space for political 
compromise. In the case of institutional engineering, the ill-defined institutions in Iran 
did not determine the phase of the transition but were the outcome of the transition. The 
non-democratic elements in institutional engineering helped the persistence of the new 
autocratic rule after the termination of the transition directed by Khomeini and the 
political elite. In this section each of respective variables will be discussed in detail. 
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Popular Mobilization 
The difference in the form of the popular mobilization, i.e. polarization in Iran 
and split of public along two lines in Portugal, can be considered a possible explanation 
for different outcomes. In Portugal, the popular mobilization in the south and the north, 
and subsequent support for different factions played an important role in pushing elite to 
compromise. In contrast, Iran faced the elite and popular polarization, and subsequent 
consolidation of the power by the Islamic Republican Party that had the support of the 
public.  
The mobilization is what Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter call a 
“popular upsurge”. It is the moment of the unification of the “trade unions, grass-roots 
movements, religious groups, intellectuals, artists, clergymen, defenders of human rights, 
and professional associations” that pressure for more liberalization (1986, 54). O’Donnell 
and Schmitter draw a theoretical scenario elaborating the consequences of the popular 
upsurge on the transition. It suggests that the emergence of a massive popular 
mobilization can reduce the chance for the formation of an oligarchic democracy. 
Moreover, the fear from a civil war due to a highly mobilized society reduces the 
likelihood of the coup or the consolidation of the power by one faction. Whereas, if the 
public and elite polarize, there will be a chance for the consolidation of power by one 
faction (1986, 55). 
In Portugal, the formation of 16 provisional governments during 15 years 
illustrates the highly mobilized and pluralized nature of the society after the collapse of 
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the Caetano’s regime (Maxwell 1986, 203). It also illustrates the inability of the elite to 
consolidate the power due to the emergence of what Graham calls a “power vacuum” 
(1992, 284). The mobilization occurred along two social classes, industrial class in the 
south in favor of communism and poor peasants in the north unhappy with 
nationalization policies. Graham discusses that in the aftermath of revolution the 
probability of an armed conflict was high. This is because the population in the center 
and the south had been mobilized along the lines of revolutionaries in favor of radical 
nationalizing reforms in the system. In contrast, in the north, the tendency was against the 
radical reforms and the population was mobilized along the lines of 
counterrevolutionaries (1992, 286).  
If in Portugal there was a split between the north and the south, in Iran the public 
was mobilized around Islamists with the leadership of Khomeini. The populations started 
the formation of organizations operating parallel to the government such as revolutionary 
committees, courts, and revolutionary guard (Bakhash 1984, 55). The most important of 
the organization emerged through popular mobilization were revolutionary committees 
(Komitehs). These organizations were formed around mosques in various cities, were 
armed, and started monitoring the revolution by purging the old regime’s actors. “These 
committees are everywhere”, stated Bazargan, the Prime Minister and the head of the 
provisional government at time expressing his frustration for the committees’ 
unauthorized actions (Bakhash 1984, 56-58). These forces have been identified as 
influential actors directing the course of the transition and gradually gained the support of 
the clerics and the Guardian Council (Bakhash 1984, 56).  
  
 
35
Although the popular mobilization seems a plausible story in explaining the 
different outcomes of the two countries, the failure of the democratization in Iran is not 
linked to popular mobilization but the role of the elite, particularly Khomeini and IRP 
members who could use it in an effective manner. The mobilization in the case of Iran 
was not the cause of the formation of the undemocratic institutions. The popular 
mobilization was just an asset in the hands of Khomeini and Islamists to actualize their 
political project. In the case of the formation of revolutionary committees, the method of 
confronting those committees helped the institutionalization, and subsequent reformation 
of them to the assets of the clerics.  
For instance, Mahdavi Kani, a cleric in the Revolutionary Council, was assigned 
by Khomeini to manage the committees. Kani approached the committees and ordered 
them to subject themselves to the provisional government. However, he also allowed the 
establishment of some committees, including his own committee. He allowed these 
committees an exercise of power like “arrest of political and ordinary criminals, members 
of former regime and counterrevolutionaries, the resolution of neighborhood disputes, 
and the identification of profiteers” (Bakhash 1984, 58). Therefore, the Islamists with the 
support of Khomeini could take advantage of the mobilized public and institutionalize 
their control. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter identify the importance of the popular mobilization on 
the phase of the transition. In the context of highly mobilized situation, the authors state 
that “one event plays a more important and immediate role that all others: the 
convocation of election” (1986, 56). As already has been explained the process of the 
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holding of elections in both countries is a control variable. However, it is worthwhile to 
mention that the popular support in elections of Portugal and Iran had different 
characteristics. 
In Iran the population was in support of the Islamists. The result of elections, both 
the referendum deciding the form of the state and later constituent assembly’s election 
shows the popularity of the Islamists. While in the aftermath of revolution, the 
referendum was held to decide the form of the state, 98.2 per cent of the Iranian public 
voted yes for the Islamic Republic. After the referendum, during the constituent 
assembly’s elections, the Islamist forces could collect the majority of the votes. In spite 
of the role leftists and liberals played in the triumph of the revolution, Islamists were the 
winners of the political game who occupied the positions, subsequently, crafted 
institutions based on their Islamic ideology beyond the control of the official provisional 
government.  
While in Iran the undemocratic forces were elected for constituent assembly, in 
Portugal, the popular support brought the moderate elite into power that challenged the 
monopolization of the power by the communists. The question is why in Portugal public 
voted for democratically inclined elite while in Iran public supported Islamists. In 
explaining the reasons behind the votes in Portugal, Wiarda Howard & MacLeish Mott 
argue that the loss of legitimacy of right, and division between the center forces, made 
the communists and socialists as the plausible options for the public. Between socialists 
and communists, the public unsatisfied with policies of communists also voted for 
socialists. The center voters also preferred socialists to communists. The result was the 
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victory of Soares of PS in elections (2001, 133). Thus, in Portugal the divisions amongst 
elite influenced the voter behavior and pushed them for the election of moderate forces. 
In Iran also, the result of the elections were outcomes of elite alliances and 
Khomeini’s role in mobilizing the public. In terms of electing the president, after the fall 
of Bazargan’s government once Khomeini supported Bani Sadr, the liberal technocrat 
educated in France, the public voted for him. From the moment that Khomeini withdrew 
his support, Bani Sadr’s government fell. Another example is Khomeini’s speeches after 
triumph of revolution. Some statements illustrate how he was aware of his popularity and 
presenting his personal visions and decisions as the needs and requirements of the nation. 
The role and influence of Khomeini will be addressed in detail later in this thesis.  
 
Difference in the amount of Power Veto-Player Could Exercise  
  Despite the similarities both counties share in terms of the institutional 
engineering, there are differences in the amount of the power veto players could exercise 
that can be considered a causal variable. However, since the Guardian Council did not 
exercise his power without Khomeini’s permission, the argument can be made that the 
institution per se was not determinative variable during transition but Khomeini who was 
the key player. 
   The Council of Revolution in Portugal and the Guardian Council in Iran exercised 
monitoring power over legislature outside of the electoral legitimacy. However, the 
amount of the power granted to the Guardian Council was more than the power of the 
Council of Revolution. In the case of Iran, unlike Portugal, the Guardian Council not only 
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was granted the power to monitor the legislature but also was given a watchdog role over 
the elections. Thus, it had the duty of qualifying the candidates to run for elections of 
executive and legislative branches. This means that the Guardian Council was given the 
power to decide whether or not a given individual fits to the arbitrary drawn qualities of a 
good candidate. Hence Guardian Council can decide whether or not a given candidate is 
morally a good Muslim and committed to the regime of Islamic Republic, and thus, could 
run for elections9. 
Besides the guardian Council as a veto-player, the exclusion of women and non-
Muslim from running for presidential elections was another difference between cases. In 
Iran, there is a debate around the usage of Arabic term “Rejal-e Siasi” (literally meaning 
Male Politicians) in constitution and whether or not the word Rejal can be used for both 
men and women. Despite disagreements around the meaning of the word, the usage of the 
word Rejal (men) in the constitution gives the Guardian Council the excuse and authority 
to exclude women from running for presidential elections. Moreover, there is also 
discrimination against non-Muslims in running for higher offices and presidency in Iran. 
Non-Muslims who are known as religious have given the right to present a representative 
of their minority in the Parliament. However, they are excluded from occupying other 
political offices in Iran (Mayer 2007, 106).  
In defining the democratic regimes, scholars took a minimalist definition 
explaining democracy as “the regime in which those who govern are selected through 
contested elections (Przeworski et al, 2000, 15). Contestation features three necessary 
                                                       
9 “Iran-Constitution”, International Constitutional Law. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html 
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assumptions as follows: “(1) ex-ante uncertainty, (2) ex-post irreversibility, and (3) 
repeatability” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 16). In the light of above definition, the Iranian 
constitution granted the power of reducing the chance of uncertainty in elections, i.e. the 
first basic requirement of a democratic regime, to the Guardian Council. The power to 
exclude some factions in elections is against the rules of the contestation. This process 
limits the sovereignty of the people by giving power to the clerics headed by the Supreme 
Leader. In contrast, the Council of Revolution in Portugal had no power in monitoring the 
electoral process. Therefore, in the case of Portugal the changing results of elections, i.e. 
entrance of various factions into the parliament who challenged the monopolization of 
power by one faction, led to the elite pacts and the reformation of the constitution. The 
result was the abolishment of the Council of Revolution.  
This comparison allows for the introduction of the institutional differences as a 
cause behind the failure of democratization in Iran. However, the investigation of 
political dynamics during the transition phase in Iran suggests the implausibility of the 
above-mentioned hypothesis. This is because the Guardian Council did not exercise its 
power exclusively. Khomeini created the institution for himself, and thus, during the first 
years after revolution, he became the sole decision-maker. For instance, during the Iran-
Iraq war, there was dispute between the Prime Minister, Mir Hussein Musavi, and the 
Guardian Council. In this dispute, Khomeini supported the government against the 
Guardian Council. Ansari discusses that the decision of Khomeini was a “pragmatic 
rationalization” and was seen by many as opportunistic and was criticized by the clerics 
(Ansari 2003, 240).  This explanation suggests that the Guardian Council as an institution 
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existed; however, the power it could exercise during the period of transition was not 
independent of Khomeini’s control.  
Therefore, a distinction can be made between the transition phase and the 
termination of transition. Transition terminated after the consolidation of the power by 
the clerics and the Islamic Republican Party. The institutionalization of the clerical power 
occurred during the transition phase due to the role of actors like Khomeini on 
constitution-making. Despite the institutional power granted to the clerics, they did not 
exercise the power during the transition period since the major decision-maker was 
Khomeini and IRP elite who could influence him and not the institution per-se. The 
political rules of the game, either democratic or undemocratic, were crafted during the 
transition period. 
Therefore, the veto-player variable is not a causal one. This is because the 
variable is subject to change and reformation until the transition is terminated. 
Subsequently, as already has been explained, the formation of the institutions per se, like 
veto-players, do not direct the mode of the transition. The transition is the result of the 
elite’s decisions that are involved in the formation of those institutions. Once the political 
system was established, either democratic or undemocratic, the defined laws in 
constitution and also the institutional design become relevant in determining either the 
quality of the democratic regime or the persistence of the new autocracy.
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Why Did Iran Fail to Democratize? 
The actor-centric literature of comparative politics considers the actor-centric 
analysis and elite decisions as the most decisive variables in directing the transition. The 
literature of democratization elaborates on the nature of the political elite involved in the 
breakdown of the old regime, as well as those who control the transition as variables 
forming the process of the transition (Linz & Stepen 1996). Linz and Stepan classify four 
groups of hierarchic military, non-hierarchic military, civilian, and sultanistic elite as the 
major actors initiating a transition (1996, 66). In transitions initiated by nonhierarchical 
military elite, the chances of consolidation are higher since the military-as-institution will 
tolerate the purges and punishments of non-democratic actors. This is because only some 
actors within the military will be subjected to attack and not the military as an institution.  
In civilian-led transitions, the prospect for the consolidation of democracy is more 
likely. The civilian leaders are considered more capable of holding negotiations since 
they have more linkages to the society. However, the exception is in societies without 
previous democratic experience where there is a possibility for the usage of a 
nationalistic discourse by the top nomenklatura, and subsequent “ethnography building” 
instead of a “democracy building”. In these cases, the absence of a civil society and a 
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competitive political society, the nomenklatura has a greater chance of consolidating the 
power through elections (1996, 68).   
Based on above-mentioned theoretical framework, the first major variable that 
can explain the difference in transition trajectory in Iran and Portugal is the character of 
those elite who initiated the transition in each country. In Portugal the elite who initiated 
the transition were non-hierarchic military who later compromised with the civilian elite. 
In Iran civilian elite led the course of the events. The Islamist elite, who had more 
linkages with the society and were supported by Khomeini, could use the discourse of 
religious nationalism to consolidate their power.  
The study of two cases so far allows for the proposition of a hypothesis regarding 
the role of elite as the determinative variables. From Graham’s (1992) point of view, the 
elite pacts in Portugal during the peak of the social mobilization and constant 
countercoups by military elite were significant decisions leading Portugal toward 
consolidation of democracy. In the case of Iran, the thesis suggests two major causes 
explaining the different outcomes between Iran and Portugal: (i) the existence of a 
charismatic leader in Iran, i.e. Khomeini, who played the crucial role as a decision-maker 
in almost every step and (ii) the alliance of the leftist and the Islamist elite in Iran, and 
subsequent isolation of the liberals from the political game.  
The outcome of Iranian elite decisions and Khomeini’s exercise of power was the 
incorporation of Khomeini’s ideological political agenda into the building of a new state 
identity, i.e. Islamic Republic. This followed by the institution crafting during the 
transition based on an undemocratic model of government proposed by Khomeini. 
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Therefore in the case of Iran (i) a new state identity was defined based on an Islamic and 
anti-western rhetoric, (ii) the Iran-Iraq war and the US Hostage Crisis were used as 
means of state identity building with Islamic character, and (iii) the parallel institutions 
were created in order to revolutionize the state. 
 
Elite Settlement versus a Charismatic Leader 
In analyzing the role of the elite in democratization, Burton, Gunther and Higley 
discuss the possible outcomes of the elite settlement. The authors explain that elite 
settlements illustrate their installations with the society and the role of the mass 
mobilization as a variable influencing the elite settlements. By keeping the variable of 
mass mobilization in the picture, the authors present several scenarios through which 
either elite settlement leads to some form of democracy, or a failure in the settlement 
ends in the establishment of a new authoritarian regime (1992, 20-21). 
In the model they present, democratic transition can follow two major paths as 
follows: (i) elite settlement and mass democratization followed by the institutionalization 
and the stabilization, and ultimately the consolidation of democracy. (ii) No settlement 
during the first stage and continuation of the mass mobilization, which results in the elite 
and mass polarization followed by two possible outcomes: either unconsolidated 
democracy/some form of pseudo-democracy or reestablishment of an authoritarian 
regime (1992, 23). In the cases of Iran and Portugal, elite played the major role during the 
transition period. While Portugal experienced elite pacts, in Iran elite and society were 
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divided and Khomeini became the key decision-maker mobilizing the population around 
himself and Islamic Republican Party.  
Graham identifies two pact signed between MFA and the political parties in April 
11, 1975 and February 26, 1976 as “partial agreements regarding issues of participation 
and representation” that ended in constitutional revisions (1992, 294). Spinola signed the 
first pact during the peak of the social mobilization after the failed countercoup. This pact 
was signed during an institutional vacuum. It defined the civil-military relations under the 
pressure of various forces involved in the formation of the new state. People were 
guaranteed the right to elect a parliament of representatives. Meanwhile the MFA could 
institutionalize its position through the Council of Revolution. This pact established a 
framework to mitigate the conflicts (1992, 278-288). The second pact was signed after a 
countercoup carried out by Eanes against the radical leftists and brought the socialists 
into power. Following this event, the power of the Council of Revolution was limited to 
solely monitor the legislature. The public also was granted the universal and direct 
suffrage to elect a president. According to Graham, these pacts occurred because civil 
and military elites realized that they are unable to solely consolidate the power (1992, 
288-289).  
General Eanes, Mario Soares of the PS, the PSD’s leader Carneiro, And Amaral 
of center CDS parties were major players in the reformation of the constitution. First, two 
pacts allowed for the regulation of the civil-military relations and partially limited the 
role of the military exercised through the Council of Revolution. Second, after the 
institutionalization of the parliamentary and the presidential elections, the support of the 
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public brought the moderate forces into the office. Consequently, they used the leverage 
they had gained to reform the constitution in 1982, thereby, consolidating democracy. In 
this context, the role of the current Prime Minister Soares was crucial in making the 
agreement pact with Eanes. Through this pact they could guarantee the right of the 
confidence vote for both executive and legislative branches for the election of the general 
staff of the armed forces. In this regard, Amaral as the head of the CSD also had a 
significant role in holding negotiations among the PSD, the PS and the CSD parties and 
helped them reaching agreements with the military (1992, 291).  
For example, Portugal’s dual executive institutional setting accommodated 
changes by reelection of Eanes as the president in 1980. In this case, Eanes willingly 
gave up the power of controlling the armed forces and transferred it to the Parliament 
(Graham 1992, 289). The constitutional reforms were suggested by the national assembly 
to abolish the Council of the Revolution and proposed a new National Defense Law. In 
this case, president Eanes disagreed with the new defense law for transferring the power 
to the National Assembly to elect the military head. However, Eanes’s commitment to the 
decision of the National Assembly made him accept the new proposal.  
Graham explains that Eanes had the idea of a professionalized and depoliticized 
military. Subsequently, he started to isolate the radicals and work with officers who were 
supportive of his idea. Therefore, he could marginalize radical military officers. Along 
this, a party-based government also was developed in 1982. Since then, the role of the 
Council of the Revolution, which had the responsibility to prevent the political power 
swing toward the right military officers, became insignificant (1992, 290).  Therefore, 
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Graham concludes that through consensus among different political elites, the process of 
transition ended in the consolidation of democracy. An agreement had been made on 
representation of different interest groups and contestation was seen as the base for the 
political game. In Portugal, the entrance of moderate groups into the game aligned with 
the fragmented mobilization helped the process of consensus-building and elite 
settlement.  
Similar to Portugal, In Iran also the anti-Shah coalition of various left, liberal, and 
Islamist forces broke after the collapse of the regime. In the absence of a common enemy, 
the ideological differences of elite forces were intensified. In this context, the radical 
Islamist faction (specifically IRP) became the winning party erasing all their former allies 
through the course of various events. If in Portugal the split led to elite pacts, in Iran 
Khomeini became the mediator among elite, and thus, the figure with the final voice in 
making crucial decisions in favor of IRP. The Khomeini’s position was essential both in 
bringing the old regime down and also directing the phase of the transition. Thus, one can 
conclude that Khomeini was the key leader who (i) had a great leadership capacity, and 
thus, his word was taken into consideration by the political elite in decision-making 
processes, (ii) could speak with the language of the masses and mobilize them, and (iii) 
could combine anti-western and Islamic rhetoric effectively and put forward an ideology 
that became the base of the state identity formation. 
The centrality of Khomeini’s position in Iranian politics goes back to the pre-
revolution period. Khomeini as the exiled cleric living in France was giving speeches 
against the Shah’s and his policies. Khomeini became one of the major political figures 
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symbolizing the opposition against the Shah’s regime (Ansari 2003, 211). Many civilian 
leaders of various political parties traveled to France and expressed their solidarity with 
him. Despite the media censorship, Khomeini’s speeches were distributed among people 
through cassettes. At the age of the collapse of the old regime and the Shah’s departure, 
the return of Khomeini to Iran was perceived as the entrance of a political figure 
symbolizing the spirit of the revolution.   
 Khomeini along with his Islamic Republican Party pushed for the adoption of the 
concept of the “Supreme Rule of Jurist” in constitution. Khomeini succeeded to grant an 
institutional power to clerics as the mediators between the parliament and the president in 
the form of the Guardian Council. He also defined a new state identity for Iran as an 
Islamic Republic. In order to clarify the role of Khomeini in the transition period, this 
section will address the key events of March 1979 referendum and constitution making 
process. It will also be discussed how events like the US Hostage Crisis and the Iran-Iraq 
war provided Khomeini and his followers the opportunity to consolidate political control. 
 
 The referendum of March 1979 
In Iran, after the collapse of the old state, the question of a new state form became 
the topic of debate. Khomeini during his exile in France had already introduced the 
necessity for the establishment of an Islamic state. In January of 1979, Khomeini issued a 
decree asking the head of the provisional government, Bazargan, to hold a referendum in 
order to replace the monarchic system with the Islamic Republic. The referendum would 
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ask people for a yes-no vote for the Islamic Republic. The liberal parties and leaders of 
moderate Islamist factions like Ayatollah Shariatmadari opposed this idea. They asked 
for the insertion of other choices or the possibility to vote between Islamic and 
democratic choices. In the context of disagreements among elite, Khomeini became 
hostile to the usage of word democratic next to Islamic and pushed for the holding of a 
referendum with a single yes-no choice for the Islamic Republic (Bakhash 1984, 72-73). 
An important speech by Khomeini in March 1st illustrated the controlling 
character of Khomeini. It also showed Khomeini’s awareness of his charismatic power 
among the people and the elite that allowed him to talk on behalf of the nation: 
“What the nation wants is an Islamic Republic: not just a republic, not a 
democratic republic, not a democratic Islamic republic. Do not use this term, 
‘democratic.’ That is the Western style” (cited in Bakhash 1984, 73). 
 
The Islamic Republic model was confirmed by 98.2 per cent of electorates. The 
Islamists and Khomeini encouraged the public for a ‘yes’ vote. Besides this, the 
opposition to the referendum also was divided. Thus, some of the opposition elite 
factions against the referendum also asked for a ‘yes’ vote. Therefore, among the 
opposition groups, only the National Democratic Front, Fedayeen, and also some ethnic 
Kurdish groups boycotted the referendum. However, other groups like Mojahedin-e 
Khalgh (Marxist Islamists) conditionally approved the referendum. The National Front, 
The Freedom Movement, the Islamic People’s Republican Party (IPRP), Islamic 
Republican Party, and Tudeh essentially urged for a ‘yes’ vote (Bakhash 1984, 73).  
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The yes vote to the referendum was perceived as a reaction to the monarchic 
regime and not necessarily a vote for a state form. The abolishment of monarchy as the 
purpose of the revolution encouraged many to vote yes. For some Islamists the vote was 
the confirmation of the state model introduced from the top. In contrast, for other factions 
the vote was the reestablishment of state-society relations and the illustration of popular 
origins of the revolution (Ansari 2003, 221). Whatever the reasons behind the ‘yes’ vote 
were, Khomeini succeeded to push his own model of the state with majority support of 
the both public and the elite factions.  
 
Constitution-Making Process 
Khomeini also used his political leverage to influence the constitution-making 
procedure. The draft of the constitution crafted by the first provisional government with 
mainly secular features created two extreme factions.  One faction was in favor of 
insertion of Islamic features and other factions were secularists who opposed it. In the 
environment of raising tensions between two sides and hot debates around the inclusion 
of Islamic elements in the constitution, Khomeini supported Islamists who were in line 
with his model of governance introduced in his book. Khomeini stated, “the constitution 
of Islamic Republic means the constitution of Islam” and called for the necessity of 
revising the draft by the radical Islamists groups (Bakhash 1984, 78). 
In the context of the political unrest and anarchy, the terror of some political elite, 
and incapability of Bazargan’s government to resolve the chaos, Khomeini allied with 
Islamic Republican Party members who pushed for the institutionalization of the concept 
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of velayat-faghih (the vice-agency of jurist). This scheme that was introduced in 
Khomeini’s “Islamic Governance” book, stemmed from the idea that solely jurists had 
the capacity to interpret the law and guide the society. Despite the split among even 
clerical elite, Khomeini used his popularity and charisma to push for velayt-e faghih 
model that was supported by IRP (Ansari 2003, 225-226). Thus, the IRP could use the 
power of Khomeini and gain his support to institutionalize its position as a veto-player.  
In explaining the role of Khomeini in Iranian institutional design, Ali Gheissari 
and Vali Nasr explain that both offices of the president and the prime minister were 
granted strong power in constitution. In the context of Khomeini’s charismatic power tied 
with the introduction of necessity of inclusion of Islam in the state-building process, the 
offices of the Supreme Leader along with Guardian Council were defined as the “ultimate 
arbiter in the tussles between the president and the prime minister” (Gheissari & Nasr 
2006, 91). The tensions between the republican structure of Iran and the role of Islam 
created a dual state with both elements of Islamism and Republicanism. In this regard, 
Brown explains that Khomeini as the leader of the revolution became the person with the 
responsibility of resolving the tensions between ill defined institutions in Iran (Brown 
2008, 71).  
In the case of Iran offices were made specifically for some individuals and 
Khomeini was written by name in the constitution and gained a lot of authority (Brown 
2008, 70). Drawing on Weber’s notion of charismatic personality as a great revolutionary 
force in bridging the gaps, Alsaif also discusses the role of Khomeini as the reconciler of 
religion and the state. Subsequently, the author explains how in the context of rising 
  
 
51
tensions between religious faction and provisional government, Khomeini proposed his 
idea of “superiority of ruling faqih” as a solution to problem through incorporation of 
Shiat paradigm into the state (Alsaif 2007, 49-51). 
The position of Khomeini in Iran’s political life is evident through the power he 
had in assigning Bazargan as the head of the provisional government or inserting changes 
in the draft of the constitution designed by the provisional government. Khomeini 
ordered the exclusion of women from candidacy for presidency office, as well as 
becoming judges (Bakhash 1984, 72-74).  
The comparison of Portugal and Iran shows how in the case of Portugal the rising 
tensions forced the elite to compromise and reform the constitution. In contrast, in Iran, 
the existence of a charismatic leader who was not in favor of democratic rules of 
governance, directed the process toward the consolidation of power by the radical 
Islamist faction who were in line with Khomeini’s ideology. Thus, the Guardian Council 
and the office of Supreme Leader as the trendsetter of conflicts were granted power in the 
constitution making the new regime an undemocratic one.  
The ideological attitude of Khomeini in defining the identity of the new state as 
an Islamic state became his political project. The events that occurred during the 
transition were used by Khomeini to push his political agenda. For instance, the US 
Hostage Crisis that occurred due to the entrance of Shah to the US inflamed the public 
unrest. Because of the fear from interference of the US in Iran based on the memory of 
1953 coup, a group of students, known as “Students Following the Line of Imam”, 
entered the US embassy and took 70 diplomats as hostages. This event provided the 
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momentum for Khomeini and IRP to play the populist politics. Inability of Bazargan’s 
provisional government to mitigate the crisis and subsequent resignation and fall of the 
government was tied with anti-imperialistic and nationalistic rhetoric that was used by 
Khomeini to mobilize the public. As already has been explained, within the context of 
nationalism, the process was set to redraft the constitution that essentially 
institutionalized the clerical power (Ansari 2003, 224-225).  
The Iran-Iraq war also became another event benefiting Khomeini and his radical 
Islamist followers to build an Islamic state. Gheissari and Nasr introduce the importance 
of the interrelation of state identity building process in Iran and war. The authors draw on 
Charles Tilly’s statement of “war made the state and the state made war” and argue that 
war became “an important determinant of the ebbs and flows of revolutionary politics, 
and the pattern of state-building” (2006, 98). In this light, after the collapse of the old 
regime, the war with Iraq became an excuse for the mobilization of the population for the 
cause of the state-building tied with the Islamization. Therefore, the form of the 
mobilization of the populous during the war was not directed toward the restoration of a 
new form of social contract between the state and the people, but a mobilization for 
Islamic ideology. As the author puts it: 
The Iran-Iraq war was important in determining the shape of the state and 
national policies, and it extended the life span of ideological policies by diverting 
attention from socioeconomic concerns and interests, it allowed the more militant 
faction of the revolutionary leadership to consolidate power and vested greater 
powers in the more radical wing of the faction (2006, 99).  
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Iraq started the war by occupying some territories from Iran. However, in 1982 
Iran succeeded to recapture those territories, specifically Khoramshahr. The liberation of 
Khormshahr played an important role in inflaming the nationalism. Ansari explains that 
although many states believed that the war would weaken the Islamic republic, the 
outcome was vice versa. Despite the lack of the military equipment and regardless of the 
advice of military generals, the leaders in Iran decided to continue the war after the 
recapture of territories. This time, the reasons for maintenance of war, specifically for 
Khomeini were domestic. The military triumph could be presented as a victory for the 
Islamic Republic, the model that Khomeini had created (2003, 237-238).  
Khomeini persisted on the continuation of war with the goal of overthrowing 
Saddam Hussein and fighting with infidels. However, finally he agreed to cease-fire 
proposed by the United Nations Security Council in 1988. Khomeini, who was blocking 
all attempts to stop the war, essentially accepted the cease-fire due to the advice of the 
military and civilian elite with stating, “taking this decision was more deadly than taking 
poison. I submitted myself to God's will and drank this drink for his satisfaction.”10  
The revolutionzation and Islamizaion of the state also were continued through the 
formation of parallel institutions. After the Iranian revolution, two major factions, i.e. 
liberals and non-liberal fundamentalists, took the power. While Khomeini appointed 
liberal parties like the Freedom Movement in the charge of the provisional government 
with the presidency of Bazargan, parallel revolutionary institutions were being formed 
                                                       
10 Robert Pear, “Khomeini Accepts ‘Poison’ of Ending the war With Iraq; U.N. Sending Mission”, 
NewYorkTimes.http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/21/us/khomeini-accepts-poison-of-ending-the-war-with-
iraq-un-sending-mission.html 
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from the below through the masses. Gradually, the liberals were overpowered by 
fundamentalists who had the support of the both Khomeini and the masses (Bashiriyeh 
1984, 132-139). The outcome was the formation of two mutually exclusive institutions. 
One was the Guardian Council appointed by Khomeini consisting Ulamas and the 
revolutionary activists. The other was the provisional government of Bazargan. While the 
latter one was in charge of maintaining the order through operating within democratic 
institutions, the former was concerned with managing the full potential of the Revolution. 
 The outcome was the formation of a ‘dual state’ where parallel institutions were 
operating simultaneously.  
“Revolutionary court ran parallel to the judiciary; Revolutionary Guard 
parallel to the military; revolutionary committees to the police; networks of 
Friday Prayer leaders and representatives of Khomeini to governors, mayors, and 
municipal authorities; parastate foundations with economic and social services 
agencies of the state; and the Reconstruction Campaign network (Jahad-e 
Sazandegi) to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development” (Gheissari 
2006, 89).  
 
The formation of a ‘dual state’ with institutions that were drawing their legitimacy 
from two different sources hindered the functionality of the regime.  Once Islamists could 
consolidate their power, these institutions helped them to operate without accountability, 
and thus, maintain their control. 
  
Elite decisions in Iran 
Along with the essential role of Khomeini in Iranian political life, the decisions 
made by the elite during the critical periods also played a significant role in helping 
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radical Islamists to consolidate their power.  The most effective decision made by liberal 
elite was their push for the election of the constituent assembly to discuss the draft of the 
constitution. After defining the form of the state as the Islamic Republic, the parties 
started to craft the constitution. The first provisional government with the leadership of 
Bazargan had the responsibility to draft the constitution. This constitution was drawn 
based on Iranian constitution of 1906. Following Gaullist model, the constitution granted 
a strong power to the president and the religious clergy no special authority. There was 
no mention of vice-agency and the Guardian Council had only limited veto power over 
legislature. Khomeini approved the draft of the constitution and demanded to put the draft 
to a referendum. The call to put the draft on referendum without the election of a 
constituent assembly faced the opposition of liberal and moderate forces (Bakhash 1984, 
74).  
 Despite the fact that decision of Khomeini wanted to put the draft to referendum 
the opposition succeeded to convince him for holding of constituent assembly’s election. 
The ultimate result of the election was mobilization of the public by Khomeini and 
entrance of Islamist forces in to the assembly. The radical Islamists, especially members 
of the Islamic Republican Party, redrafted the constitution and granted extensive power to 
the Guardian Council (Bakhash 1984, 75). The liberals miscalculated the popularity of 
Khomeini and the Islamist rhetoric among people. The outcome was the push for the 
constitution assembly’s election that brought radical Islamists into power and ended in 
the reformation of the draft of the constitution in favor of the Islamic Republican Party.   
  
 
56
The alliance of leftists with Islamists was another decisions helping Islamic 
Republican Party to consolidate its power. The resignation of Bazargan’s government 
during the Hostage Crisis led to the isolation of the National Front and the Freedom 
Movement. Ansari explains that after the resignation of Bazargan’s government, “Islamic 
Marxists” consisting of Mojahedin-e Khalgh and their allies, as well as their “Islamist” 
allies including the Islamic Republican Party acquired more power. These latter groups, 
unlike provisional government’s liberals were in support of the occupation of the US 
embassy. Thus, both the alliance between the leftists and radical Islamists against the 
democratic and liberal forces, as well as the decision of liberals to withdraw from the 
political game, helped the consolidation of power by Islamists (Ansari 2003, 226-229).  
In Portugal, the elite compromises and pacts favored the democratic rules of the 
game. In contrast, in Iran the alliances between leftists and Islamists served the isolation 
of liberals, and later consolidation of power by radical Islamists who were not in favor of 
democracy. Leftists who found the collectivization policies of Islamists, as well as their 
anti-Western rhetoric close to their beliefs entered into what Mottale calls “opportunistic 
alliance” (1995, 31). The pragmatic calculation of the leftists in supporting Khomeini 
against the liberals during the critical moments helped the inflammation of the conflict 
among respective factions. The outcome was the seclusion of pro-democratic forces, and 
later oppression of leftists from the political scene by Islamic Republican Party and 
Khomeini. 
The anti-Western ideology became the reason for the cooperation of leftists with 
Islamists. For example, Mottale discusses that after the collapse of the Shah’s regime, the 
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concern for purges and removal of older regime’s elite became first agenda. After purges, 
IRP started to isolate the liberal nationalists. In this process the cooperation of leftists, 
Marxists, Communists, and Islamic Marxists (Mojahedin) with the radical Islamists 
played crucial role in attacking the liberal nationalists by labeling them as pro-Westerners 
(Mottale 1995, 31). The split among left occurred after the resignation of Bazargan’s 
government, and subsequent push for the doctrine of velayat-faghigh (vice-agency of 
jurist). Thus, Mojahedin branch of leftists expressed disagreements and opposed the 
Islamists (Ansari 2003, 229). Following the attacks on elites, bombings, and 
demonstrations carried out by Mojahedin, IRP with the leadership of Khomeini started to 
execute Mojahedin, and later other communist forces (Mottalle 1995, 33-34). 
The liberals’ lack of popular support, weak organizational power, and the 
shortage of resources, did not benefit them. Similarly, leftists also did not have rural and 
urban mass support, and thus, could not present serious treats. In contrast, the 
fundamentalist party (IRP) could keep the population mobilized through its network of 
bazaar and mosques, along with the power of clergy in popular organizations (Bashiriyeh 
1984, 126-129).  
Therefore, the argument can be made that the coalition of leftists with Islamists 
was beneficial solely for Islamists. In other words, the Islamists were not in need of 
leftists’ support to put their political and ideological agenda forward. However, the fact 
that leftists sided with the Islamists left the liberals isolated and alone in the political 
game. Consequently, the liberals were unable to manage the disorder, and resigned from 
the power. Following their resignation, the democratically inclined faction of elite who 
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had succeeded to gain Khomeini’s support and enter the provisional government was 
defeated.  The liberals lost their political power in decision-making process and IRP 
exclusively used the support of Khomeini to consolidate its control. 
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Conclusion 
The comparison of transition phase in Iran and Portugal allows for the 
examination of theories of transition. In confirming the actor-centric approaches in 
explaining the transition, the study illustrates how the specific decisions of actors are 
endogenous to the political outcomes. The crafting of constitution and institutions is the 
outcome of the elite divisions, alliances, their installations with the society and their 
capacity to mobilize. Once the transition terminates, the established institutions and 
crafted constitution become frameworks for the operation of newly formed regime. The 
cases under study well illustrate the process through which the actors build the new 
political system. The elite alliances during the uncertain period of popular mobilization 
and political chaos have been identified as the most important elements shaping the 
course of transitions.   
In Portugal the MFA and civilian elite unable to manage the situation agreed on 
power sharing. The result was the creation of ill-defined institutions where both MFA and 
parliament/president could exercise power. The compromise they made was considered a 
positive step to limit the absolute exercise of power by the MFA. In the following years, 
the character of the elite in the office, like Eanes, and their willingness to democratize the 
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system allowed for the reformation of the constitution leading to the consolidation of 
democracy in Portugal. 
Similarly in Iran, the political and civilian elite directed Iran to authoritarianism. 
The alliance of leftists with radical Islamists for ideological reasons isolated the liberals. 
With liberals having been marginalized, the Islamists who could gain political leverage 
by the support of the charismatic leader, Khomeini, managed to persecute leftists pushing 
them outside of the political game.  The outcome was the ability of Islamists to maneuver 
over the Hostage Crisis and the Iran-Iraq war and build a system with undemocratic 
features.  
Despite the fact that during the transition phase both countries had ill-defined 
institutions, in Portugal the absence of a charismatic leader forced the elite to operate 
within the constitutional framework. In Iran the constitution was crafted and the 
government was formed. However, the charismatic leader, Khomeini, could exercise 
extensive power bypassing the institutions. In the case of Portugal, the operation within 
the legal framework and respect for the vote of the population helped the elite to reform 
the constitution. In Iran, Khomeini became the major decision maker bypassing the legal 
mode of the decision-making.  
The course of events in Iran helped the elite in support of Khomeini to impose 
their political ideology. The Hostage Crisis and the Iran-Iraq war provided the IRP with 
excuses to rationalize Islamic ideology and isolate their opponents. Playing on the 
rhetoric of nationalism and anti-imperialism, the Islamist elite took the best advantage of 
radical mobilized public and helped the establishment of parallel institutions and the 
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formation of a dual state. During the transition phase, these parallel institutions hindered 
the efficient performance of the government. Having the support of the Khomeini and 
Islamists, those revolutionary institutions legitimized their own performance. Following 
the death of Khomeini and termination of the transition they turned to the assets of 
revolutionaries to enforce and maintain the Islamist political agenda.
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